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Expert Testimony in Illinois
INTRODUCTION
Traditional common law rules' created a complex set of con-
straints that restricted the use of expert testimony.' The class of
subjects sufficiently formidable to the average layman to require an
expert's opinion was strictly construed. 3 When an expert was quali-
fied to render an opinion, the law dictated resources that the expert
could rely upon to produce admissible evidence.' This limitation, in
turn, necessitated the appearance of numerous witnesses to lay the
appropriate foundation so that such resources could be admitted
into evidence. Finally, since the expert could not resolve any con-
troverted facts in dispute, he was required to state his opinion in the
hypothetical .5
These common law restrictions rest upon the premise that the
trier of fact may be overly influenced or mislead by an expert's
opinion on a matter.' However, even accepting this premise, the
operation of the above rules creates unnecessary confusion in the
1. The distinction between traditional or historical common law and present Illinois com-
mon law is used throughout this article. For purposes of this discussion, traditional common
law is a concept which represents fundamental principles which once governed the use of
expert testimony, while the term present Illinois common law is meant to reflect more recent
case developments. For a complete discussion of the history of expert testimony and the
development of the rules which govern the subject, see Hand, Historical and Practical Con-
siderations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REv. 48 (1901).
2. As one commentator has noted, "[i]n respect to admissible expert opinion, a body of
rules has grown up involving techniques and skills almost equalling in complexity the subject
matter about which the expert testimony is given." Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REv.
414, 417 (1952).
3. Hence, expert testimony was limited to matters "beyond the ken of the average jurors,"
and therefore necessary to their understanding of the disputed facts before them. See text
accompanying notes 12-13, infra.
4. If experts reasonably relied on matter which was inadmissible, such information could
not be disclosed to the trier of fact. See text accompanying notes 51-53, infra.
5. See discussion accompanying notes 96-99, infra.
6. Although the limitation on the basis of an expert's opinion is primarily derived from
evidentiary principles, see text acompanying notes 51-53 infra, the restrictions prohibiting an
expert from testifying on matters within the common knowledge of the jury, or upon the
ultimate issue, and the requirement of the use of hypothetical questions reflect such a con-
cern. Thus, expert testimony on the ultimate issue is deemed to usurp the function of the
jury. See, e.g., Hughes v. Wabash Ry. Co., 342 Ill. App. 159, 173, 95 N.E.2d 735, 742 (1950).
Expert testimony on matters of common knowledge is thought to invade the province of the
trier of fact. See, e.g., E. CLEARY et. al, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §
13, at 29 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK (2d ed.). The hypothetical format
assures that the expert does not appear to believe the facts on which his opinion is based.
See McElhaney, Expert Witnesses and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 MERCER L. REv.
463, 472 fn.44 (1977) [hereinafter cited as McElhaney].
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introduction of expert testimony. The potential problem of undue
persuasion could be resolved without hindering the effective presen-
tation of expert testimony to the trier of fact. In recognition of this
fact, Illinois has abandoned many of the common law limitations
and has gradually adopted a more sensible approach to the use of
expert testimony. The most recent reform, which broadened the
permissible matter underlying an expert's opinion, is indicative of
this trend.7 The only major surviving common law restriction is the
mandatory use of the hypothetical question.8
This article will discuss present Illinois common law vis a vis the
proposed Illinois Rules of Evidence9 governing expert testimony.
Since the Proposed Rules basically codify the existing law concern-
ing experts in Illinois, the article will focus on relatively recent
changes made in the Illinois common law and the inconsistencies
created by these reforms.
ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
Under present Illinois common law, expert testimony is admissi-
ble if a court concludes that such testimony will assist the trier of
fact in understanding the evidence. 0 Both Illinois law and Rule 702"1
reject the traditional restriction of expert testimony to matters
"beyond the ken of the average juror."' 2 The test is not whether the
expert's explanation is necessary 3 to the fact finders understanding
7. See text accompanying notes 56-62, infra.
8. See text accompanying notes 96-99, infra.
9. The Proposed Rules of Evidence presently remain before the Illinois Supreme Court
in a no action status. For purposes of this article the Proposed Rules which are discussed will
be cited as Rule XXX. The Federal Rules of Evidence which govern expert testimony are
identical to the Proposed Rules except in the instance of Rule 705. See note 113, infra. Of
course, since the two versions are the same there is no need to discuss them separately.
10. See, e.g., Merchants Nat'l Bank of Aurora v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co., 49 Ill. 2d 118,
273 N.E.2d 809 (1971); S. GARD, ILLINOIS EVIDENCE MANUAL RULES 218-19, at 254-57 (1963 &
Supp. 1978); E. CLEARY, HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE §§ 7.43-7.68 (2d ed. 1963).
11. Rule 702 reads as follows:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
12. MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 6, § 13, at 30.
13. The "necessity" requirement limitation was finally abandoned in Miller v. Pillsbury
Co., 33 Ill. 2d 514, 211 N.E.2d 733 (1965). Rejecting the notion that permitting expert testi-
mony on matters of common knowledge would invade the province of the jury, the court
reasoned that "[tihe jury still may accept or reject such testimony." Id. at 516, 211 N.E.2d
at 734.
The "necessity" requirement may be warranted in some contexts. For example, courts are
generally reluctant to admit the testimony of an accident reconstructionist which merely
supplements or contradicts eyewitness testimony, unless there is a compelling need to apply
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of the evidence, but whether the expert can assist the trier of fact.
This approach widens the scope of expert testimony."
Under the assistance criterion, an expert may be permitted to
testify as to matters within the common knowledge of the jury.' '" For
example, in Stanley v. Board of Education," plaintiff claimed dam-
ages from an injury sustained while participating in a recreational
activity supervised by the defendant. The trial court allowed an
expert on recreational activities to testify as to what constituted safe
distances between groups of children at play. On appeal, the defen-
dants argued that the court erred in admitting expert testimony on
a subject that was within the trier of fact's common understand-
ing. 7 The court rejected this contention and concluded, "[wie
think, . . . the better rule would give a trial judge a wide area of
discretion in permitting expert testimony which would aid the triers
of fact in their understanding of the issues even though they might
have a general knowledge of the subject matter."'1
scientific principles in order to resolve the dispute. See, e.g., McGrath v. Rohde, 53 Ill. 2d
56, 285 N.E.2d 619 (1972); People v. Dietschweiler, 21111. App. 3d 707, 315 N.E.2d 585 (1974).
14. Yet under Federal Rule 702, the federal courts have demonstrated a more restrictive
approach to the admissibility of expert testimony in two areas: criminal trials and emerging
sciences and technology. Illinois courts, in applying the common law version of Federal
Rule 702, should do the same.
The prejudicial impact of expert testimony is deemed greater in criminal than in civil trials.
"[Wjithin the context of a criminal trial, 'scientific or expert testimony particularly courts
the second danger [of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or misleading the juryl
because of its aura of special reliability and trustworthiness'." United States v. Green, 548
F.2d 1261, 1268 (6th Cir. 1977).
In the context of emerging sciences and technology courts are reluctant to permit a verdict
to rest primarily on evidence which has not yet "cross[ed] the line between the experimental
and demonstrable stages." United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 557 (6th Cir. 1977) (evi-
dence of ion microbiopic hair analysis inadmissible due to inability to duplicate tests, inade-
quate size of hair sample, and lack of promulgated standards for use of the technique). But
cf. United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1975) ("voice-printing" evidence admissible
due to sufficient indicia of reliability). See also Latin, Remote Sensing Evidence and Environ-
mental Law, 64 CAL. L. REV. 1300 (1976).
When courts are confronted with expert testimony concerning an "emerging science", they
have employed the "Frye" test in order to determine its admissibility. The "Frye" test
requires that the new scientific principles "must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which [they belongi." Frye v. United States,
293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). A test substantially similar to the "Frye" test was applied
in People v. Jennings, 252 Ill. 534, 96 N.E. 1077 (1911), where the court became the first in
the United States to admit expert testimony regarding the technique of fingerprinting.
15. See, e.g., Jamison v. Lambke, 21 111. App. 3d 629, 316 N.E.2d 93 (1974) (traffic
engineer allowed to testify to relationship between auto speed and braking distances); Carlson
v. Hudson, 19 Il. App. 3d 576, 312 N.E.2d 297 (1974) (tree trimmer permitted to testify to
incomplete chain saw cut).
16. 9 Il1. App. 3d 963, 293 N.E.2d 417 (1973).
17. Id. at 967, 293 N.E.2d at 422.
18. Id. at 974, 293 N.E.2d at 425. In support of its decision the court cited Federal Rule
702 with approval.
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Qualification of an Expert
After a preliminary finding by a court that expert testimony may
be introduced, the question then becomes whether the proffered
witness qualifies as an expert. Federal Rule 702 provides general
guidelines for evaluating an expert's qualifications which are consis-
tent with Illinois common law. In Illinois, "[e]xpert evidence is not
confined to classed and specialized professions, but is applicable
wherever peculiar skill and judgment . . . are required to explain
results or to trace them to their causes."' 9 Similarly, Rule 702 states
that an expert may be qualified to testify by reason of his
"knowledge, skill, experience, training or education."2 " Both stan-
dards clearly permit an expert to acquire his expertise from practi-
cal experience."'
Under this approach courts have qualified a variety of "experts"
in recognition of their peculiar skills and judgment. Illinois common
law recognizes expert testimony to include a farmer's knowledge
about the effects of hail on corn, 2 an automobile mechanic's experi-
ence with brake systems,23 a medical assistant's observations con-
cerning the nature of a wound,24 and a police officer's testimony on
the operation of Bolito, a Puerto Rican lottery. 25
Moreover, the standard used to determine whether a witness
qualifies as an expert implicitly recognizes that the requirements for
qualification are not unduly stringent. An expert witness need not
be the foremost expert in his field or a specialist in a particular field.
For example, a doctor of internal medicine was qualified to testify
about neurological ear, nose, and throat problems although he was
not a specialist in these areas.2 1 While an expert need only possess
"minimum" qualifications, courts nonetheless require that the ex-
pert's particular skills and expertise be related to the specific facts
19. People v. Jennings, 252 Ill. 534, 550, 96 N.E. 1077, 1082 (1911).
20. Illinois common law has basically adopted the language of the federal rule with respect
to expert qualifications. See, e.g., Cannell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 25 Ill. App. 3d 907,
323 N.E.2d 418 (1975). See also S. GARD, ILLINOIS EVIDENCE MANUAL Rules 225-36, at 263-79
(1963 & Supp. 1978); E. CLEARY, HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE §§ 11.11 - 11.15 (2d ed. 1963).
21. These standards reject earlier, traditional restrictions on just who could testify as an
expert because, "[in the beginning experts were 'men of science' who gave opinions as to
nautical matters, handwriting or medical science." W. KING & D. PILLINGER, A STUDY OF THE
LAW OF OPINION EVIDENCE IN ILLINOIS 255 (1942).
22. Cannell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 25 Il. App. 3d 907, 323 N.E.2d 418 (1975).
23. Galluccio v. Hertz Corp., 1 Il1. App. 3d 272, 274 N.E.2d 178 (1971).
24. Piacentini v. Bonnefil, 69 Il. App. 2d 433, 217 N.E.2d 507 (1966).
25. People v. Montes, 57 Ill. App. 3d 824, 373 N.E.2d 658 (1978).
26. Skaug v. Johnson, 29 Ill. App. 3d 239,330 N.E.2d 265 (1975). Accord, People v. Steelco
Chemical Corp., 22 Il. App. 3d 582, 317 N.E.2d 729 (1974), Bollmeier v. Ford Motor Co., 130
Ill. App. 2d 844, 265 N.E.2d 212 (1970).
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in issue. Under this additional criteria, an expert witness is more
likely to be allowed to testify where there is a similarity between his
knowledge and experience and the subject matter in dispute.27 For
example, in Murphy v. Hook,2" an engineering physicist was prof-
fered as an expert on accident reconstructions. The court concluded
that the witness, though a fully qualified engineering physicist,
could not testify as an expert on accident reconstruction because
of his inexperience with respect to automobile collisions.29
The difficulty with the attempt to measure a nexus between the
expert's specific experience and the facts in issue is that too rigid
an application of this requirement might disqualify many experts.
This would circumvent the liberal Illinois approach to qualifying
experts, and the admission of expert testimony itself. Clearly, unless
there are obvious and extreme disparities between the expert's expe-
rience and the facts of the case the witness should be qualified by
the court. Of course, once the court has determined that a witness
qualifies as an expert, opposing counsel is still free to point out
discrepancies between the expert's experience and the facts at hand.
Cross-examination on this point could damage the expert's credibil-
ity and in turn influence the weight given his testimony by the trier
of fact.'
27. 11 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 702.10 at VII-29 (2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
MOORE'S (2d ed.)].
In this respect a major issue confronting Illinois courts is determining whether a psycholo-
gist may testify, as an expert, regarding a defendant's sanity, i.e., his mental condition and
its causal relationship to the crime. An Illinois court has permitted a psychologist to testify
as to whether the defendant was suffering from a mental defect at the time of the crime.
People v. Felton, 26 Ill. App. 3d 395, 325 N.E.2d 400 (1975). The court, however, refused to
allow the psychologist to opine whether, in view of the mental defect, the defendant was
legally insane at the time of the crime. Id. at 400, 325 N.E.2d at 403. Another Illinois case,
in dicta, implied that the scope of a psychologist's testimony could be extended to include
the sanity issue. People v. Noble, 42 Il. 2d 425, 248 N.E.2d 96 (1969).
The issue of sanity is usually considered to be a medical diagnosis and is thus regarded as
within the province of the psychiatrist. People v. Skeoch, 408 II1. 276, 96 N.E.2d 473 (1951);
People v. Gilliam, 16 Ill. App. 3d 659, 306 N.E.2d 352 (1974). The federal courts, however,
have permitted properly qualified psychologists to give an opinion on what is essentially the
ultimate issue of sanity. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Jenkins v.
United States, 307 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1962). A liberal reading of Rule 702, with its special
emphasis on assistance and practical experience of the expert, should result in permitting
qualified psychologists to testify on the issue of sanity.
28. 21 111. App. 3d 1006, 316 N.E.2d 146 (1974).
29. Id. at 1011, 316 N.E. 2d at 151.
30. S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES Op EVIDENCE MANUAL Rule 702, at 414 (2d
ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as SALTZBURG & REDDEN].
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Form of Expert Testimony
Under Illinois common law, an expert is not required to testify
solely in opinion form. He may merely disclose certain basic princi-
ples, leaving the trier of fact to draw the requisite inferences. 3' Rule
702 tracks the common law by allowing the expert to testify "in the
form of an opinion or otherwise."
When the expert witness testifies in the form of an opinion, Illi-
nois common law permits him to offer his opinion on matters involv-
ing the ultimate issue of a case. 3 Thus, Illinois common law is in
accord with Rule 704.33 Traditionally experts were not allowed to
render opinions on ultimate issues in order to prevent them from
"usurping the function of the jury. 34 Wigmore accurately labeled
this rationale "a mere bit of empty rhetoric. '35 The function of the
expert witness is to draw those inferences which the jury is unable
to reach on its own; of necessity, these inferences must often em-
brace the ultimate issue. 3 To restrict expert testimony to matters
other than the ultimate issue might leave the jury uninformed about
the crucial aspects of the case. The Illinois common law has recog-
nized that the exclusion of ultimate issue testimony is undesirable
and illogical. 37 Moreover, Illinois courts have held that opinions on
31. "[Njothing in the nature of things precludes the expert from merely giving an exposi-
tion upon the subject at hand, without expressing an opinion." E. CLEARY, HANDBOOK OF
ILLINOIS EVIDENCE § 11.4, at 186 (2d ed. 1963). See Shorb v. Webber, 188 Ill. 126, 58 N.E. 949
(1900) (physician allowed to relate theories concerning intoxication and the effect of alcohol
on the bloodstream).
32. "Despite early precedents to the contrary, the reviewing courts of Illinois have ap-
proved the practice of permitting the expert to express directly his opinion upon ultimate
issues..." In re Roberts Park Fire Protection Dist., 20 11. App. 3d 282, 289, 314 N.E.2d
208, 213 (1974). Accord, Clifford-Jacobs Forging Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 I1. 2d 236, 166
N.E.2d 582 (1960). See generally E. CLEARY, HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE MANUAL § 11.11,
at 191 (2d ed. 1963); S. GARD, ILLINOIS EVIDENCE MANUAL Rule 222, at 260-62 (1963 & Supp.
1978).
33. Rule 704 provides that: "Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the
trier of fact." This rule is also applicable to lay witnesses. SALTZBURO & REDDEN, supra note
30, Rule 704, at 436.
34. Hughes v. Wabash Ry. Co., 342 Ill. App. 159, 173, 95 N.E.2d 735, 742 (1950).
35. 7 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 1920, at 17 (3d ed. 1940 Supp. 1977) [hereinafter cited WIGMOsRE (3d ed,)].
The traditional rule has been described as "unduly restrictive, pregnant-with close questions
of application and the possibility of misapplication, and often unfairly obstructive to the
presentation of a party's case..." MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 6, § 12, at 27-28.
36. "If he is truly an expert and is needed because the area of testimony is outside the
knowledge of the average juror, then he must of necessity tread in the area of the ultimate
questions." Brinton, The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: Pointing the Way to Needed
Changes in Illinois, 5 J. MARSHALL PRAC. & PRO. 242, 249 (1972).
37. "It is rewarding to see that the drafters [of the Federal Rules of Evidence] have put
[Vol. 10
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ultimate issues do not "invade the province of the jury" since the
jury is free to accept or reject the expert's testimony."'
There are, however, two interrelated qualifications on the recep-
tion of ultimate issue testimony stemming from the general proposi-
tion that all opinions must be helpful to the trier of fact. First, the
opinion must not be phrased in terms of "inadequately explored
legal criteria."3" Secondly, the opinion must not merely tell the jury
how to decide." Generally, this latter issue is raised when the expert
has not presented sufficient facts or reasons to support his opinion
to the jury.4 Failure to satisfy these criteria may mean exclusion of
the expert's testimony.42
BASES OF OPINION TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS
Essentially, the basis of an expert's opinion consists of the under-
to rest the rather meaningless and nonsensical objection: 'I object - that is the ultimate
question.' What is an expert present to answer, if not one of the ultimate questions?" Id.' at
249.
38. See Merchants Nat'l Bank of Aurora v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co., 49 Ill. 2d 118, 273
N.E.2d 809 (1971) (expert allowed to testify that a railroad crossing was inadequately pro-
tected); Scott v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 26 Ill. App. 3d 971, 326 N.E.2d 74 (1975) (expert
permitted to testify to the ultimate issue of product's defectiveness).
39. McCormick's classic illustration of this problem is as follows:
Thus the question, 'Did T have capacity to make a will?' would be excluded, while
the qustion 'Did T have sufficient mental capacity to know the nature and extent
of his property and the natural objects of his bounty and to formulate a rational
scheme of distribution?' would be allowed.
FED. R. EviD. 704, Advisory Comm. Notes, citing MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 6, § 12, at
29.
An opinion given in response to the first question would be useless to the jury, whereas an
opinion based on the second question, which incorporates the three factors necessary to a
determination of legal capacity, would be helpful.
The need for this requirement, however, may have been overstated. While some terms
cannot readily be described in terms of legal criteria, their legal impact can be fully compre-
hended. In United States v. Hearst, 563 F. 2d 1331, 1351 (9th Cir. 1977) it was submitted
that the question, "Did Appellant rob the bank?", was legally and conceptually identical to
the question, "Did T have the capacity to make a will?", and therefore should have been
excluded. The court rejected appellant's contention, noting that in order to evaluate
"capacity to make a will" three legal criteria had to be explored. In contrast, "Itihe terms
'voluntarily rob a bank' or 'act under fear of death or grave bodily harm' do not suffer from
that . . . disability. The average layman would understand those terms and ascribe to them
essentially the same meaning intended by the expert witness." Id. at 1351.
40. FED. R. EvID. 704, Advisory Comm. Notes.
41. In Tabatchnick v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 F.R.D. 49 (D.N.J. 1975) the court commented
on the expert's ultimate issue testimony in this manner: "This testimony [concerning slides
of pathological tissue] cannot be helpful to a jury and with the explanation given, the jury
could examine the slides with no more guidance than if they were looking at ink blots." Id.
at 56. Accord, United States v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 416 F. Supp. 316 (D.N.J. 1976).
42. "The trial judge may well be more liberal in the use of his discretion to admit opinions
and inferences as to collateral matters and less liberal in order to see that the concrete details
are brought out as to more crucial matters." MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 6, § 12, at 26.
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lying facts or data used by the expert to arrive at his conclusions.
An expert may obtain this underlying material from personal obser-
vations before or during trial, and from facts or data reasonably
relied upon by experts in a particular field in forming opinions upon
a subject.43 Illinois common law and Rule 703 both permit an expert
to utilize these sources in formulating his opinion."
Illinois courts have always allowed experts to testify on the basis
of information gathered from personal observation or examination. 5
In this respect, the expert witness is no different than any other
witness, and is competent to testify as to matters within his personal
knowledge. For example, a treating physician may render an opin-
ion based upon a medical examination conducted prior to trial. 6
Similarly, Illinois courts have permitted experts to develop their
opinions from facts revealed to them during trial. An expert present
throughout the trial may formulate an opinion on the basis of the
testimony and evidence introduced. 7 The expert may also render an
opinion based upon facts revealed to him in a hypothetical ques-
tion." Under either of these alternatives, the expert assumes that
the facts upon which he relies are true."9 Further, the expert's testi-
mony is itself confined to facts offered into evidence. 0
The foregoing are the traditional techniques used for offering ex-
pert testimony. Historically, common law standards required the
expert to base his opinion only upon facts admitted into evidence. 5'
43. See text accompanying notes 56-63 infra.
44. Federal Rule 703 provides that:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing.
If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence.
45. E. CLEARY, HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE § 11.9, at 189 (2d ed. 1963). See Skalon v.
Manning, Maxwell & Moore Inc., 127 Ill. App. 2d 145, 262 N.E. 2d 146 (1970).
46. E.g., Sherman v. City of Springfield, 77 Ill. App. 2d 195, 222 N.E.2d 62 (1966).
47. See People v. Covey, 34 I11. 2d 195, 215 N.E.2d 220 (1966). Use of this method is
ordinarily confined to testimony that is undisputed. See Graham v. St. Luke's Hospital, 46
Ill. App. 2d 147, 196 N.E.2d 355 (1964); Henry v. Hall, 13 I1l. App. 343 (1883). If the rule
were otherwise, the expert would be permitted, in effect, to evaluate the testimony of other
witnesses, a function which is within the sole province of the jury. Id.
48. See, e.g., Keystone Steel & Wire Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 42 Ill. 2d 273, 246 N.E.2d
228 (1969).
49. W. KING & D. PILLINGER, A STUDY OF THE LAW OF OPINION EVIDENCE IN ILLNOIS 274
(1942).
50. See text accompanying notes 51-53, infra.
51. E. CLEARY, HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE § 11.9 at 189 (2d ed. 1963). In Kanne v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 310 11. App. 524, 530, 34 N.E. 2d 732, 734-35 (1941), the court
held that the opinion of an expert is to be allowed only if it is based on and supported by
facts in evidence. Accord, Theesfeld v. Eiles, 122 I11. App. 2d 97, 258 N.E.2d 39 (1970);
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Thus, an expert's testimony could be stricken if unsupported by the
evidence. The rationale for this restriction was that an opinion
based upon facts not in evidence was worthless, because the trier of
fact lacked the data with which to evaluate the reliability of the
expert's conclusion. 2 Accordingly, Illinois courts consistently la-
beled such opinions "speculation, guesswork, and conjecture." 53
Moreover, such testimony was considered flagrant hearsay,51 since
the facts testified to were not subject to the procedural safeguards
of the judicial truth seeking process. 5
Illinois courts have repudiated this traditional limitation on the
bases of expert testimony by accepting expert opinions derived in
part from materials not in evidence. In People v. Ward,"6 the Illinois
Supreme Court quoted Federal Rule 703 with approval.57 The court
recognized the modern trend away from the common law's restric-
tion of an expert's testimony to facts in evidence, and concluded the
better view is that experts may use data reasonably relied upon by
others in a particular field to reach an opinion upon a subject." In
Ward the trial court admitted a psychiatrist's opinion on the defen-
dant's sanity, despite the fact that it was based upon information
not in evidence. The psychiatrist, a state witness, had gathered this
information from hospital records, psychological tests conducted by
a psychologist, and a psychiatric examination performed by another
psychiatrist. Although the data used by the testifying psychiatrist
would not normally have been admissible," the court held-that the
expert's opinion could be based upon such materials since psychia-
trists normally rely upon them when forming an opinion on the
sanity of a patient. 0
Under present Illinois common law, therefore, an expert is per-
mitted to fashion his opinion upon facts reasonably relied upon by
others in his field. This rule represents an important expansion of
the traditional bases for expert testmony, since such facts need not
Schwartz v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 35 Ill. App. 2d 25, 181 N.E.2d 826 (1962).
52. See Spector, People v. Ward: Toward a Reconstruction of Expert Testimony in
Illinois, 26 DEPAuL L. REv. 284, 285 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Spector]. See generally
MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 6, § 15, at 34.
53. Gariti v. Karlin, 127 Ill. App. 2d 166, 173, 262 N.E.2d 179, 182 (1970).
54. Spector, supra note 52, at 285.
55. Id. at 285. McCormick has commented that this reasoning is unsound because "almost
all expert opinion embodies hearsay indirectly, a matter which the courts often recognize and
accept." McCoRMicK (2d ed.), supra note 6, § 15, at 36.
56. 61 Ill. 2d 559, 338 N.E.2d 171 (1975).
57. Id. at 567, 338 N.E.2d at 176.
58. Id.
59. The data was inadmissible because it was compiled by others who did not testify. Id.
60. Id. at 568, 338 N.E.2d at 177.
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be admissible substantively. It aligns the judicial procedure which
governs expert testimony with the actual practice of the experts
themselves.' Experts normally rely upon certain resources which
are not admissible under the rules of evidence, 2 and this approach
relaxes the constraints which control expert testimony. The applica-
tion of Ward saves judicial time by removing the necessity of parad-
ing witnesses in order to lay a complex foundation for an expert
opinion.63 Moreover, it allows experts to deliver more complete and
accurate testimony to the trier of fact."
Ward Applied
Rule 703 represents the most radical departure from traditional
common law within Article VII of the Federal Rules of Evidence 6 5
61. This rationale is illuminated as follows:
[A] physician in his own practice bases his diagnosis on information from numer-
ous sources and of considerble variety, including statements by patients and rela-
tives,_reports and opinions from nurses, technicians and other doctors, hospital
records, and X-rays. Most of them are admissible in evidence, but only with the
expenditure of substantial time in producing and examining various authenticating
witnesses. The physician makes life-and-death decisions in reliance upon them. His
validation, expertly performed and subject to cross-examination, ought to suffice
for judicial purposes.
FED. R. EvD. 703, Advisory Comm. Notes.
62. Id.
63. "The emphasis can be on choosing witnesses who are needed to explain things satis-
factorily to the jury's understanding, rather than on parading witness after witness to lay a
complex foundation for a simple opinion." McElhaney, supra note 6, at 482.
Under the Ward holding, material constituting the basis of an expert's opinion may be
synthesized and revealed by a single expert witness without having to be independently
introduced into evidence. This, as McEhlaney notes, "creates a revolution in the logistics of
expert testimony." Id.
This "revolution", though beneficial, does raise a constitutional question arising from sixth
amendment concerns. Where an expert renders an opinion based upon facts or data obtained
from persons not present at trial, is the defendant's constitutional right to confront his
accusers abridged? This question has been answered in the negative for three reasons. First,
the introduction of expert testimony in criminal trials is subject to more stringent review.
United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261 (6th cir. 1977). Secondly, the evidence is solely the
expert's opinion and not the factual basis of his opinion. See United States v. Burrell, 505
F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1971). See also
MOORE'S (2d ed.), supra note 27, § 703.50, at VII-55 to 57. Finally, the right to cross-examine
the expert so as to explore and discount the basis of his opinion sufficiently safeguards the
defendant's sixth amendment rights. Id.
64. Hopefully this more complete and "realistic" approach to expert opinion formulation
will diminish the somewhat antagonistic relationship between the scientific community and
the judicial process, an antagonism stemming from the dissonance between "the scientific
method, in which objectivity is emphasized . . . [and] the adversary method, where truth
is established by deciding between the opposing contentions of interested parties." Note, The
Doctor in Court: Impartial Medical Testimony, 40 S. CAL. L. Rv. 728, 728 (1967).
65. McElhaney, supra note 6, at 480.
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Its recognition in Illinois constitutes a major revision of the common
law, and its significance should not be obscured by an over-
technical construction of the Ward holding.
The Illinois Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the Ward
holding.6  In Lawson v. G.D. Searle & Co. ,67 the court relied on Ward
and allowed an expert to render an opinion supported by scientific
data from clinical studies not admitted into evidence. 5 At trial, the
expert testified that the decedent's disease was not causally related
to the use of an oral contraceptive. The court held that the informa-
tion in the published studies were of the type reasonably relied upon
by medical experts in forming such opinions. Moreover, the court
concluded that the expert could relate the out-of-court statements
for the purpose of explaining how he reached his conclusion.'
Rule 703 itself is unclear on whether the expert may state the
underlying factual basis of his opinion for the trier of fact.7' Cer-
tainly the rule allows an expert's opinion to rest upon certain types
of data not admissible in evidence, and in this respect defeats a
motion to strike the opinion on those grounds. Logically, the ration-
ale of Rule 703 should support the disclosure of such otherwise inad-
missible information to the trier of fact.72 Searle supports the con-
clusion implied by Rule 703 that an expert may give a full account
of the methodology and resources used in reaching inferences or
conclusions.
Although both Ward and Searle dealt with expert opinions in the
medical field,7 3 the reasonable reliance test embodied in Rule 703
should extend to any field of expertise.7" After a court resolves pre-
66. See also, Clemons v. Alton & S. R.R. Co., 56 Ill. App. 3d 328, 370 N.E.2d 679 (1977)
(surgeon's opinion admissible though based in part on psychiatrist's report); People v. Espi-
noza, 54 Ill. App. 3d 36, 369 N.E.2d 325 (1977) (psychiatrist's opinion of defendant's sanity
admissible though partially based on hospital reports); In re Smilley, 54 I1. App. 3d 31, 369
N.E.2d 315 (1977) (physician's opinion based partially on psychiatrist's "intake" report inad-
missible since this type of report not customarily relied upon by physicians); People v.
Williams, 36 Ill. App. 3d 680, 344 N.E.2d 648 (1976) (harmless error to admit pathologist's
opinion based in part on toxocologist's report); Smith v. Williams, 34 Il1. App. 3d 677, 339
N.E.2d 10 (1975) (admitted physician's opinion based partially upon psychiatrist's report).
67. 64 III. 2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 779 (1976).
68. Id. at 557, 356 N.E. 2d at 786.
69. Id.
70. 1d
71. SALTEBERG & REDDEN, supra note 30, at 426.
72. It would make little sense to align the judicial process with the practice of experts
while not in court in order to provide more complete and accurate testimony, and then keep
the basis of this more accurate testimony from the trier of fact. See also SALTEBER, & REDDEN,
supra note 30, at 426-27.
73. As have the cases following Ward and Searle. See cases cited in note 66, supra.
74. For examples of broad application of this rule in the federal courts, see United States
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liminary questions of law, the trier of fact determines the weight
given to the expert's testimony. The introduction of the foundation
of the expert's opinion enables the trier of fact to make a more
informed evaluation of the expert's conclusions. Accordingly, there
is no justification for restricting the disclosure of an expert's metho-
dology or resources to the medical field. Such a narrow interpreta-
tion of Ward ignores the reasoning behind the decision.
Furthermore, it is critical to distinguish the use of underlying
data or facts under Rule 703 from the question of substantive admis-
sibility. Several cases have interpreted Ward as establishing a new
hearsay exception.7 5 This interpretation is very misleading. First,
the underlying basis of the expert's opinion is offered for limited
purposes.76 The question is not whether the underlying basis is of-
fered for the truth of the matter asserted.77 It is simply whether the
material satisfies Rule 703. When evidence not otherwise admissible
is offered pursuant to Rule 703, the trier of fact may use the data
only for the purpose of determining whether the basis of the expert's
opinion is sound.7" At an appropriate time the trial court should
entertain a motion for a limiting instruction to the jury concerning
the use of such materials." A party is certainly entitled to such an
instruction when the inadmissible data tends to prove another dis-
puted fact. 0 Second, even if Rule 703 operates to except matter from
the hearsay doctrine, matters that are sufficiently trustworthy to be
v. Sims, 514 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1975) (psychiatrist's testimony regarding defendant's sanity
could be based upon information obtained from government attorneys and IRS agents); Elgi
Holding, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 511 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1975) (opinion that arson had
occurred could be based on unintroduced laboratory report); Nanda v. Ford Motor Co., 509
F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1974) (opinion that firewall around an automobile gas tank was needed
could be based upon a report of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics entitled:
"Appraisal of the Hazard to Human Survival in Airplane Crash Fires.").
75. In In re Smilley, 54 11. App. 3d 31, 35, 369 N.E.2d 315, 318 (1977), the court asserted:
"Necessarily, we agree with respondent that the standards for admissibility of the 'hearsay'
testimony set forth in Ward were not met in this case." (emphasis added) Accord, Clemons
v. Alton & S. R.R. Co., 56 Ill. App. 3d 328, 370 N.E.2d 679 (1977) (court referred to the
"hearsay" rule in Ward and held that the offered testimony fell within that rule).
76. "Evidence not otherwise admissible is not admitted under this Rule [7031 for its
truth; it is admitted to explain the bases of the expert opinion." SALTZBERG & REDDEN, supra
note 30, at 427.
77. Because data is not offered for it own validity does not mean it is not being used to
show or explain the truth of the matter asserted by the expert's opinion. Hence the use of
hearsay standards to determine the admissibility of the underlying data itself is both inaccur-
ate and confusing.
78. SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 30, at 427.
79. Id.
80. McElhaney, supra note 6, at 482 n. 83. In general, a request for such an instruction
would be a mistake, for in most instances it would only serve to underscore the unwanted
testimony. Id.
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offered substantively under hearsay exceptions are distinguishable
from material which is inadmissible except as the basis of the ex-
pert's opinion.' The former category is scrutinized under traditional
trustworthiness standards within the hearsay rule, while the latter
is primarily governed by the reliance test embodied in Ward and
Rule 703.82
The Reasonable Reliance Standard
Rule 703 indicates that an expert may base his opinion on data
reasonably relied upon by experts in a particular field.8 The under-
lying matter, if reasonably relied upon, need not be otherwise ad-
missible into evidence.8 Whether a particular matter falls within
this category is a question left to the trial court's discretion. 5 Rule
703 directs a court to determine "reasonable reliance" on the basis
of prevalent practice in the field of expertise at issue. Nevertheless,
courts sometimes determine the question of reasonable reliance
with reference to evidentiary concepts of reliability. 6 The fact that
the underlying matter in question usually passes muster under both
standards of reliability is immaterial. An essential purpose of Rule
703 is to align judicial practice with the out-of-court practice of the
experts themselves. 7 Therefore, courts should define "reasonable
reliance" in the context of standards employed by experts in a par-
ticular field." The court's initial conclusion that an expert is quali-
fied to testify should mean that the expert's underlying data is also
acceptable for Rule 703 purposes. When a court refuses to defer to
81. Spector, supra note 52, at 290.
82. "Rule 703 recognizes that there may be data which has not yet reached the degree of
trustworthiness required by the hearsay rule entitling it to consideration by the jury which
nevertheless is a sufficiently reliable for an expert to assess." 3 J. WEINTEIN & M. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE § 703 (01), at 703-04 (1976) [hereinafter cited as WEINsTEIN].
83. FED. R. EVID. 703.
84. Id.
85. This follows from the trial court's inherent power to determine the ultimate admissi-
bility of evidence.
86. See cases at note 75, supra.
87. FED. R. EVID. 703, Advisory Comm. Notes.
88. Under this approach a court may reason as follows:
Certainly, I must decide the foundational question under Rule 104(a). What I am
to decide is not whether I think it is reasonable to rely on such information, but
whether I find the profession in question thinks it reasonable to do so. While I
personally would not rely on this information, the Federal Rules defer to the stan-
dards of the profession of the expert witness, outside of gross extremes, which are
not presented here. Any objection to the basis for this expert opinion may be shown
on cross-examination, and goes to the weight the jury should give the opinion, but
does not affect its admissibility. The evidence is admitted.
McEhlaney, supra note 6, at 486.
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the standards of the experts, the purpose of Rule 703 is frustrated.
It does not follow from the foregoing that the application of Rule
703 permits experts to dictate standards of evidentiary proof." A
review of the matters within the sound discretion of the court indi-
cates that the spectre of the expert usurping the judicial role is
unfounded. First, it is the court who determines whether the ex-
pert's testimony will assist the trier of fact. Second, assuming a
matter is reasonably relied upon by experts in a field, the court has
the power to limit or deny proof on any matter on the basis of
exclusionary rules. 0 This does not mean that the court reconsiders
the question of reasonable reliability. Under such circumstances,
the issue is not one of reliability, but one of exclusionary policies
which often involve constitutional considerations.' A court may
conclude that the policy at stake is not sufficiently vindicated by a
limiting instruction as to the basis of the expert's opinion." Finally,
the court may restrict proof on a matter when its probative value is
clearly outweighed by other countervailing factors. Thus, if the dan-
gers of prejudice, unfair surprise or the potential of ineffective cross-
examination exist due to the expert's reliance on out-of-court mate-
rials,93 the court may exclude the expert's opinion. Admittedly, the
underlying materials may be considered untrustworthy under evi-
dentiary principles. However, the determinative factor is the preju-
dice to the opposing party, and it is that countervailing considera-
tion which supports a court's ruling to exclude the facts or data.
PRESENTATION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
Discussion of the presentation of expert testimony must be quali-
fied in two respects. First, the trial court has considerable discre-
tionary control over such matters. In effect, the court retains a de
facto veto over the mode of presentation. Thus, examining counsel
may elect alternative formats unless the court requires otherwise.
Second, examination of the possible formats for introducing expert
89. Id.
90. For example, best evidence and relevancy rules may delimit the scope of an expert's
reasonable reliance. For a discussion of these issues see Spector, supra note 52, at 299-300.
91. Id. For example, an expert could base his opinion on illegally obtained evidence.
Though an expert may reasonably rely on such material in his own practice, fourth amend-
ment considerations may compel the exclusion of the opinion. Obviously, this is a matter for
the trial judge. Id.
92. Id.
93. Although no constitutional defect has been found in relation to the lack of effective
cross-examination of the inadmissible bases of an expert's opinion, see note 63, supra, a judge
presumably retains the power to exclude an opinion on these grounds in the interest of
fairness. See also text accompanying notes 118-20, infra. E.g., Sherman v. City of Springfield,
77 Ill. App. 2d 195, 222 N.E.2d 62 (1967).
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testimony that are supported by Illinois common law is essentially
an abstract inquiry devoid of the tactical considerations present in
a courtroom situation. Accordingly, the circumstances at trial may
dictate the most advantgeous format for presenting such testimony.
This discussion simply explores the feasible alternatives a litigator
may choose from in eliciting expert testimony.
Illinois Common Law
Traditionally, when an expert witness renders his opinion the
mode of introducing his testimony is restricted. Certainly an expert
with first-hand observations, such as the treating physician, is per-
mitted to testify concerning matters within his personal knowl-
edge." However, if the expert testimony only entails a series of
conclusions developed primarily from a field of expertise," the mode
of introducing such testimony changes. In such situations, the con-
ventional hypothetical question is used to elicit the expert's opin-
ion.9"
The hypothetical question is the traditional common law method
for the presentation of expert testimony. When examining counsel
uses this format the expert's conclusion follows a question carefully
developed to include the underlying bases of the expert's opinion.
Several common law rules define the permissible scope of the hypo-
thetical. First, the expert may not decide any controverted facts
contained in the hypothetical. He may only assume that the facts
are true solely for the purpose of forming an opinion. 7 Second, the
question must include all undisputed facts which are relevant and
material to the opinion, since their omission is misleading to the
trier of fact.98 Finally, there must be evidence which tends to prove
the assumed facts in the hypothetical." However, there are two
94. McCormick refers to this type of witness as a "non-fact" expert. MCCORMICK (2d ed.),
supra note 6, § 14, at 31.
96. In Illinois the hypothetical question is the required mode of eliciting an opinion from
an expert who does not testify from personal knowledge. See, e.g., Keystone Steel & Wire
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 42 Ill. 2d 273, 246 N.E.2d 228 (1969); Pyle v. Pyle, 158 Ill. 289, 41
N.E. 999 (1895); Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry. Co. v. Shires, 108 Il1. 617 (1884);
People v. O'Neal, 118 Ill. App. 2d 116, 254 N.E.2d 559 (1969); Sherman v. City of Springfield,
77 Ill. App. 2d, 222 N.E.2d 62 (1967); E. CLEARY, HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE § 11.9 (2d
ed. 1963); S. GARD, ILLINOIS EVIDENCE MANUAL RuLEs 220, 221, 223 (1963 ed. & Supp. 1978).
97. Clifford-Jacobs Forging Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 I11. 2d 236, 243, 166 N.E.2d 582,
587 (1960).
98. Lange v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 105 Il1. App. 2d 99, 110, 245 N.E.2d 35,
40 (1969).
99. Botwinis v. Allgood, 113 Ill. App. 188, 194 (1903). Contra, People v. Yonder, 44 II1. 2d
376, 385, 256 N.E.2d 321, 326 (1969) (hypothetical question may include only proved facts).
But cf. Gus T. Handge & Son Painting Co: v. Industrial Comm'n, 33 I11. 2d 201, 206, 210
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exceptions to this last principle. When examining counsel guaran-
tees that evidence will be introduced, a fact not presently in evi-
dence may be included in the question.I°° Furthermore, Ward
establishes that an expert may reasonably rely on materal which
is otherwise not admissible. 10' It follows that such underlying facts
or data can be included within the hypothetical. 02
The general rules defining the contours of the hypothetical ques-
tion prove difficult to apply in practice. 03 Moreover, while the es-
sential purpose of the hypothetical is the disclosure of the underly-
ing bases of the expert's opinion to the trier of fact,'0 ' that purpose
is far too easily muddled by the clumsy practitioner, and all too
often subordinated by the skillful litigator.' 5 The hypothetical for-
mat encourages overly long, confusing questions and affords exam-
ing counsel an opportunity to sum up his case in the middle of
trial.'06 Notwithstanding these difficulties, and despite repeated
criticism, Illinois common law apparently continues to mandate the
use of the hypothetical question.
The hypothetical is the logical counterpart of the common law
limitation which restricted the basis of an expert's opinion to facts
or data admitted into evidence. In theory, the hypothetical method
prevents the expert's testimony from misleading the trier of fact.' 7
Counsel elicits the expert's opinion in a hypothetical form so that
the expert will not appear to be testifying as to the truth of facts
for which he had no first-hand information.)os The Ward decision's
N.E.2d 498, 501 (1965) (question proper if assumed facts are within the realm of circumstan-
tial evidence).
100. Gibson v. Healy Brothers & Co., 109 Ill. App. 2d 342, 349, 248 N.E.2d 771,776 (1969).
101. See text accompanying notes 56-60 supra.
102. Although no cases have been found on point it follows that if the purpose of the
hypothetical question is the orderly disclosure of the bases of an expert's opinion, WEINSTEIN,
supra note 82, § 701(01), the question should disclose all the bases, including the material
upon which an expert "reasonably relies." Otherwise, the rationale for the hypothetical is
defeated.
103. It is a logical necessity, but a practical incubus; and logic here must be
sacrificed . . . . It is a strange irony that the hypothetical question, which is one
of the truly scientific features of the rules of Evidence, should have become that
feature which does most to disgust men of science with the law of Evidence.
2 WIGMORE (3d ed.), supra note 35, § 686, at 812.
104. WEINSTEIN, supra note 82, § 705(01) at 705-5.
105. WIGMORE (3d ed.), supra note 35, § 686, at 812.
106. The case of Borowski v. Von Solbrig, 14111. App. 3d 672, 303 N.E.2d 146 (1973), rev'd,
60 Ill. 2d 418, 328 N.E.2d 301 (1975), exemplifies the abuses associated with the hypothetical
question. Three hypothetical questions extended over 158 pages of the record. Objections to
and rulings on these questions covered another sixty pages. One question which required
several hours to ask was totally incomprehensible to the court and jury.
107. McElhaney, supra note 6, at 472 n. 45.
108. Id.
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recognition of Federal Rule 703 may present a challenge to some of
these assumptions underlying the hypothetical in Illinois. Ward
indicates that the underlying basis of expert opinion may include
facts or data not in evidence, but reasonably relied upon by experts.
When the underlying basis of an expert opinion includes facts not
in evidence, the question arises as to how such material should be
disclosed to the trier of fact.
Under a strict hypothetical format, examining counsel will dis-
close the data, and the expert is then required to assume the truth
of the inadmissible facts as he hears them reuttered in a hypotheti-
cal question.10a In such circumstances, this hypothetical mode of
presentation constitutes an unnecessary charade that promotes con-
fusion."" With respect to underlying data not in evidence, it is the
expert who has the relative first-hand information, and he is usually
in the best position to offer an explanation of such facts. The pur-
pose of disclosure to the trier of fact is best served through a
straight-forward explanation by the expert. Moreover, if there is a
concern about misleading the trier of fact as to the truth of such
facts, a limiting instruction would be just as useful as an attempt
to frame the matters in a hypothetical. The expansion of underlying
bases for expert opinions recognizes a modern trend to align judicial
procedures with those of the experts.' Subsequent to Ward, the
expert should be allowed greater flexibility in the format of his
testimony so that he may disclose the foundation of his opinion
himself.
PROPOSED RULE 705
Greater flexibility in the presentation of expert testimony should
follow an expansion of the permissible matter upon which an expert
may rely in developing his conclusions."2 The enactment of some
version of Rule 705 would assure this result."' Rule 705 obviates the
109. McElhaney points out the absurdity of this situation: "It would hardly make sense
to provide that [the bases for an opinion need not be admissible in evidence] and then
require that the expert assume the truth of those inadmissible facts as he listens to them
recited in a hypothetical question." Id. at 487.
110. In this respect, Spector notes that:
With the adoption of Rule 703, there is no longer a need for the hypothetical
question. The original purpose of the question was to elicit the basis of the expert's
opinion in a non-objectionable manner. Now the expert's opinion no longer must
be based solely on admissible evidence. Thus, there is no reason to retain this
confusing and often abused practice.
Spector, supra note 52, at 304-05.
111. FED. R. EvID. 703, Advisory Comm. Notes.
112. See discussion accompaying notes 108-10 supra.
113. The text of the Federal version of Rule 705 is "The expert may testify in terms of
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requirement of preliminary disclosure of the underlying basis of an
expert's opinion,"' and thus eliminates the mandatory use of the
hypothetical question."' Rule 705 also allows examining counsel to
use alternative formats in presenting expert testimony unless the
court requires otherwise. Moreover, enactment of Rule 705 would
compliment the adoption of Rule 703 in People v. Ward, and give
the field needed consistency."' Illinois courts have so far failed to
adopt a rule similar to 705. The remainder of this article will briefly
analyze the potential impact of abandoning the mandatory hypo-
thetical format. It is submitted that the difficulties associated with
such reform would be insubstantial.
The primary argument against the adoption of Rule 705 is that
in effect, it places the burden of disclosing the foundation of an
expert's opinion upon opposing counsel. Since Rule 705 allows an
expert to state his opinion without prior disclosure of the underlying
matters relied upon, opposing counsel may not learn the foundation
of the expert's opinion on direct examination." 7 Consequently, the
advantages which accrue to examining counsel on direct examina-
tion are said to create substantial disadvantages for opposing
counsel on cross-examination."' Admittedly, this claim has merit
when opposing counsel is not sufficiently appraised of the bases of
an expert's opinion prior to trial. However, assuming adequate
discovery, the enactment of Rule 705 itself does not work to any
party's advantage per se. If examining counsel foregoes his oppor-
tunity to present the underlying foundation of the expert's opinion,
opinion or inference and give his reasons therefore without prior disclosure of the underlying
facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required
to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination." The proposed Illinois version
is the same except it provides, "Any party may require the expert to disclose the underlying
facts or data on cross-examination." The Illinois version thus emphasizes the right of the
opposing party to have such matters disclosed. For purposes of discussion, Rule 705 will be
used to refer to both provisions herein.
114. Note that Rule 705 still requires the expert to state his "reasons", see note 113, supra,
but the provision clearly states that a foundation of underlying data is not required. While
all of this is subject to the court's discretion, Rule 705 recognizes that experts may testify in
a more flexible fashion than lay witnesses when rendering an opinion.
115. See FED. R. EvID. 705, Advisory Comm. Notes. Although Rule 705 eliminates the
mandatory use of the hypothetical, the option is still available to examining counsel. The
enactment of some version of Rule 705 may actually go unnoticed by many litigators, since
they will continue to elect the hypothetical format for strategic reasons. It has been argued
that Rule 705 deserves more careful attention. See McElhaney, supra note 6, at 488.
116. See text accompanying notes 56-61 supra.
117. Traditionally the foundation of the expert's opinion was disclosed to the cross-
examiner via the hypothetical question.
118. This criticism was anticipated in the advisory committee notes to Fed. R. Evid. 705.
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opposing counsel stands prepared to delve into those matters re-
lied upon which discredit the expert's testimony.
Several safeguards under Illinois law remove the possibility of
such unfairness in the event Rule 7Q5 is adopted. First, Illinois
statutes provide for extensive discovery of expert witnesses. Under
these provisions parties are entitled to the reports, tests, and state-
ments the expert relies upon."' Moreover, any deficiencies in the
discovery process can be rectified prior to trial, 20 and therefore the
opportunity to test the foundation of the expert's conclusion is pre-
served. Second, Illinois traditionally permits great latitude in the
cross-examination of expert witnesses. 121 This latitude is comple-
mented by the right of any party to require disclosure of the bases
on cross-examination. 2 2 Finally, the cross-examiner is not com-
pelled to elicit facts other than those which are unfavorable to the
expert's opinion.' 23 Accordingly, cross-examining counsel may probe
into such underlying facts or data in a selective fashion.
Another difficulty which some predict will follow adoption of Rule
705 is that the trier of fact is more likely to hear opinions which are
ultimately inadmissible. 2 This might occur after an expert relates
his opinion on direct exaination without first disclosing its underly-
ing bases and such matters are later disclosed on cross-examination.
If the court finds the underlying matter either inadmissible or of a
type not "reasonably relied" upon, the opinion must be excluded.
Unfortunately, the jury has already heard the opinion.2 1 While the
119. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 58(3) (1977) provides for discovery in civil cases as follows:
A party shall not be required to furnish the names or addresses of his witnesses,
except that upon motion of any party disclosure of the identity of expert witnesses
shall be made to all parties and the court in sufficient time in advance of trial so
as to insure a fair and equitable preparation of the case by all parties.
Extensive discovery of expert witnesses is available in criminal cases pursuant to ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110A § 412(a)(i) (1977).
120. "This practice should be standard at any pre-trial conference." WEINSTEIN, supra
note 82, § 705(01), at 705-9.
121. The rule, is of course, a familiar one that cross-examination of a witness
should be confined to matters brought out upon the direct examination. But in
determining the scope of the "matter" testified to on direct examination the rule
is not to be given a narrow or technical application. This is especially true with
respect to expert testimony. . . . Great latitude is accordingly allowed in the cross-
examination of an expert.
Muscarello v. Peterson, 20 Ill. 2d 548, 553-54, 170 N.E.2d 564, 568 (1960). See also Opp v.
Pryor, 294 Ill. 538, 128 N.E. 580 (1920); Horowitz v. Michael Reese Hosp., 5 Ill. App. 3d 508,
284 N.E.2d 4 (1970).
122. FED. R. EvID. 705.
123. FED. R. EVID. 705, Advisory Comm. Notes.
124. McElhaney, supra note 6, at 488.
125. The problem that then confronts both the court and counsel in this situation is
commonly referred to as attempting to "unring the bell." Id., at 489 n. 97.
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court may direct the jury to disregard the expert's opinion, the
instruction's efficacy is questionable.2"
This situation can be avoided by various trial techniques. As a
practical matter, cross-exaination revealing the faulty basis of the
expert's opinion may totally discredit his testimony. When opposing
counsel wishes to prevent the expert opinion from reaching the jury,
a motion in limine may be necessary.12 Thus, when pre-trial discov-
ery indicates that the basis of the expert's opinion is inadmissible
and not of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field, the
court may limit or prohibit proof on such matters. In addition,
counsel can request a voire dire examination of the prospective wit-
ness at trial prior to the admission of the expert's opinion. This
could demonstrate to the judge the inadmissibility of the expert's
opinion. 2
Many of the potential difficulties involved in the enactment of
Rule 705 can most easily be avoided if courts and counsel do not
read Rule 705 too literally. The rule should not be construed so as
to totally eliminate the use of foundation testimony where neces-
sary. 2 Rule 705 provides flexible guidelines which govern the pres-
entation of such testimony. Examining counsel should recognize
that the presentation of the expert's opinion in an understandable,
persuasive, and meaningful manner to the trier of fact will certainly
necessitate at least minimal foundation testimony in most cases.3',
More importantly, counsel may receive some enlightenment from
the court concerning such mpatters, since ultimately the court has
126. "Telling a jury to disregard something they have just heard is about as effective as
telling someone not to think of pink elephants." Id.
127. Motion in limine is a procedure through which counsel can obtain a ruling on the
admissibility of evidence before such evidence is introduced. In criminal trials, this technique
is often called a motion to suppress.
128. The voire dire examination can be quite an effective trial technique. It is far more
effective to destroy the foundation of an expert's opinion before it goes to the jury, rather than
attempting to undercut it on cross-examination. McElhaney, supra note 6, at 476.
129. This is generally how the federal courts have interpreted Rule 705. For example, in
Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259, 271 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976), the
court asserted that even under Rule 705, "There must, of course, be sufficient facts already
in evidence or disclosed by the witness as a result of his investigation to take such testimony
out of the realm of guesswork and speculation." Accord, Daniels v. Matthews, 567 F.2d 845
(8th Cir. 1977). See Logsdon v. Baker, 17 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 416 F. Supp. 316 (D.N.J. 1976).
130. WEINSTEIN, supra note 82, § 750(01), at 705-7.
Weinstein offers two additional reasons why disclosure might be necessary. First, a witness'
familiarity with specific data may have to be demonstrated in order to qualify him as an
expert. Secondly, an expert witness with first hand knowledge may be required to recite the
facts underlying his opinion, because the facts themselves must be disclosed in order to satisfy
the burden of proof. Id.
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the power to require foundation. The court may determine that the
cross-examiner would be unfairly burdened without preliminary
disclosure on direct, 3' or conclude that the opinion is on such a
critical matter in the case that an unsupported opinion is inadmissi-
ble. 13 Further, Rule 705 must be viewed in context with other evi-
dentiary principles. Thus, if the disclosure of basis is insufficient,
the judge may exclude the opinion for lack of probative value on the
ground that it fails to assist the trier of fact.
As outlined above, the problems commonly associated with aban-
doning the mandatory requirement of the hypothetical question,
and preliminary disclosure in general, are somewhat illusory. The
benefits offered by no longer requiring total disclosure on direct are
substantial. First, by no longer mandating the use of the hypotheti-
cal question the court will no longer encourage a confusing and
exploitative trial technique.13 Second, adopting Rule 705 will elimi-
nate any remaining inconsistency between the Ward holding and
the use of the hypothetical question. 34 Lastly, since preliminary
disclosure will no longer be required on direct examination, and the
cross-examiner may inquire selectively into those underlying
facts,"" much confusion and trial time can be saved.
CONCLUSION
In most respects, the law governing the use of expert testimony
in Illinois reflects a modern approach to the subject. Ward's expan-
sion of the permissible bases of an expert's opinion, the reception
of expert testimony on ultimate issues, and the liberal standards
relating to the introduction of expert testimony are the main compo-
nents. Elimination of the mandatory use of the hypothetical ques-
tion will complete the modernization process and bring internal
consistency to the Illinois law of expert testimony.
ANDREW D. EICHNER
131. Although this problem can usually be avoided, see discussion accompanying notes
118-123, supra, certain situations may arise, perhaps involvng "unfair surprise", which could
compel a trial judge to require preliminary disclosure of the bases of an expert's opinion.
132. MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 6, § 12 at 26.
133. See discussion accompanying notes 103-106, supra.
134. See discussion accompanying notes 108-111, supra.
135. See discussion accompanying notes 122-124, supra.
19791

